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ABSTRACT
This paper considers optimal enforcement when individuals may be imperfectly informed
about the probability of apprehension. When individuals are pcrfectly informed, optimal
sanctions are maximal because, as Gary Becker (1968) suggested, society can economize on
enforcement resources by reducing the probability of apprehension while increasing sanctions.
But when individualsimperfectlyobserve the probability of apprehension, it may be optimal to
apply lower sanctions while expending more enforcement resources.
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and NEER1. Introduction
Gary Becker's (1968) classic paper introduced the point that enforcement
effort and sanctions are substitutes in enforcement. A lower level of
enforcement effort can be offset by increasing sanctions, which econoaizes on
enforcement costs. Even activities involving little harm should receive the
maximal sanction; the probability of apprehension for such acts may be reduced
in order to avoid overdeterrence. Subsequent papers have explored and
qualified Becker's insight concerning optimal enforcement policy.'
An implicit assumption in Becker's analysis of optimal sanctions, which
has been carried over to subsequent investigations of optimal enforcement
policy, is that individuals accurately observe the enforcement probability set
by the government.2 While there presumably is a positive relationship between
actual and perceived levels of enfornement, it is implausible that
individuals' probability estimates are generally accurate, particularly when
the probability is extremely low, Will most individuals know that the
probability of being ticketed for double-parking is 2.74% while that for
speeding is 0,89%? Indeed, survey evidence on individuals' perceptions
indicates that estimates vary widely.3
The literature •has offered various explanations for why nonmaximal
sanctions may be desirable: riak-sversion [Kaplow (1991); Polinsky and Shsvell
(1979)];nonmonetary sanctions Kaplow (1990b); Polinsky and Shsvell (1984));
avoidance costs [Mslik (1990)); marginal deterrence [Shavell (lP9lafl; general
enforcement [Mookherjee snd mg (1990); Shavell (1991b)]; individuals'
differences in wealth, resulting in differences in the maximum feasible fine
[Polinsky snd Shavell (1991)); individuals' imperfect information about
whether acts are subject to sanctions [Keplow (l99Osfl; and differences in the
actual probability of apprehension [Bebchuk and Kaplow (1991)).
2 Sab (1991) independently draws attention to the possibility (and discusses
in reater depth the plausibility of the assumption) that individuals'
esttmates of the probability of apprehension may differ. His paper, however,
focuses on positive analysis: he develops a rich model of how different
estimates may come about and evolve over time and draws insightful
implications for how crime rates oay be affected. In contrast, we explore the
normative question --whichhe explicitly reservas -- ofhow different
probability estimates sffect optimal enforcement policy. The two papers are
thus complementary.
Sah (1991) discusses some of the findings.This paper reconsiders the problem of optimal aanctions when actors'
information about the probability of apprehension is imperfect. We do not 4
sasunethat actors err systematically in one direction or the other. Rather,
we assume that individuals observe the probability of apprehension with some
noise; consequently, some individuals' estimates are too high and others' too
low, with the average being unbiased.
Our primary result is that, when individuals are imperfectly informed in
this manner, it may not he optimal to set the sanction at the highest feasible
level. The reason is that a giwen error in observing the probability of
apprehension affects the Expected sanction in an amount that depends on the
level of the sanction, To illustrate, suppose that an act causes a harm of
13. The maximum possible sanction is 500, so optimal deterrence could be
achieved with a probability of 2%. Alternatively, one could employ a sanction
of 1CC and a probability of 10%. Suppose, however, that half the individuals
overestimate the probability by one percentage point end the other half
underestimate it hy the same amount. For the first regime, half fate an
expected ssnction of 15 (3% x 500) and half face an expected sanction of 5
(1% x 500); for the alternative regime, half fate 11 (11% x 100) and half S
(9% x 100). Clearly, under the former regime, there will he greater
ovsrdeterrenco for the individuals who overestimate the probability and
greater underdeterrence for those who underestimate it. If the resulting loss
in welfare exceeds the cost of raising the actual probability from 2% to 10%,
the letter regime would be superior.
This example assumes that the magnitude of noise in individuals' estimaLes
is independent of the probability of loss. The phenomenon, however, is more
general. Even if the magnitude of errors in individuals' estimates increases
as the probability of apprehension increases, there will still be an
improvosent in behavior so long as the relative size of the error fells.
Thus, in the example, so long as individuals' misestimates are less than 5
percentage points when the probability of apprehension is raised to 10%,
expected sanctions would be closer together under the regime with s higher
probsbility end lower sanction, end problems of over- and underdeterrence
would be less.
-2-In the next section we present our iitodel and analysis, after which we
offerbrief concluding remarks concerning the empirical importance of the
phenomenon we eddresa.
2. Model
A. Framework for Analysis
Risk-neutral individuals choose whether to commit an act that benefits the
actor by b, which is assumed to be distributed uniformly in the interval
(0,1). Acts impose a social coat, h. We essume h C 1, so that some acts are
socially beneficial.
The government chooses a probability of enforcement, p. and a sanction, s,
ao as to ieeximize the sumofindividuals' benefits minus the harm caused by
cheir acts and enforcement costs x(p). We assume C > 0 and C > 0.
Horeovet. the maximum feasible sanction is s, which can be understood as the
maximum wealth of individuals where the sanction is a fine. We assume further
that the sanction is costless to impose, as in the familiar Becker framework.
We depart from the familiar model by assuming that actors are imperfectly
informed about p. Specifically, individuals observe p with an error; they
observe either p+e(p) or p-e(p), each with 50% probebility. The government
cannot observe each actor's estimate.
We analyze firet the baseline caae in which e(p) —0 for all p and then
the caae in which e(p) > 0.
B. Perfect Information
When individuals accurately observe the probability of apprehension, all
obviously observe the same p. The government's problem is to choose p and a




subjectto the constraint that a ￿ LTheBecker result is immediate.
Proposition 1: when i.ridivithials acc-u±ately observe the probability of
apprehension, the optimal sanction is maximal.
Proof: As one increases a and reduces x so as to keep pa constant, the
first term in (1) is unaffected and the magnitude of the second term falls, so
the optimum is where the constraint is binding Q.ED.
C..Imperfect Infonnation
When a(p) > 0, individual probability estimates differ. The government's




subject to the constraint that a ￿ ;.
Proposition2: When individuals observe the probability of apprehension
subject to an error, the optimal sanction may be less than the maximal one.
Proof! Begin with a —sand letdenote the optimal probability of
apprehension given a. Consider the effect on welfare of raising p and
reducing s such that pa remains fixed. That is,takethe derivative of (2)
with respect to p with ds/dp
(3) (p+e)s)(se'-es/p)+
—(e/p-e')ea5-
wheree' denotes de/dp. If one assumes that, at (,1) d(e/p)/dpC 0 --that
is, that the percentage error falls as p rises --thefirst term is positive,
reflecting an improvement in welfare from an ioprovement in behavior. It ten
readily be demonstrated that for enforcement technologies for which x' is not
too large, the entire expression will be positive,4Q.E.D.
-4-The intuition behind Proposition 2 is as follows. Beginning at the
maximum feasible sanction and the probability thet is optimal given this
sanction, a reduction in the sanction accompanied by an increase in the
probability that keeps the actual expected sanction constant will improve
behavior whenever the reletive size of the error -theratio of the error to
the actual probability --fallsas the probability rises. (The example in the
introduction had this characteristic: the error wes censtent, so the relative
error declined as the probability was increased,) Behavior improves because
the perceived expected sanctions --(p+e)sfor some and (p-e)s for others --
movecloser together, As e result, those who overestimate the probability are
overdeterred less and those who underestimate the probability are
underdeterred less.5 So long as it is not too costly to raise the probability
somewhst, the optimum will involve a sanction that is not maximal.
3. Conclumj.on
We have examined the problem of optimal enforcement when individuals are
imperfectly informed about the probability of apprehension, When individuals
observe this probability with some random error, it may be optimal to employ
less than the maximum feasible sanction with s grestsr probability of
apprehension. While raising the prcbability is costly it cay improve
The demonstration is complicated only by the fact that the first term must
be evaluated at ,whichitself depends on the technology x(p). Examples can
most easily be constructed using a less direct technique that avoids this
interdependence. Set —sand choose probabilitythat maximizes the sum of
the first two terms in (2) --i.e.,—h/s-ee' .(Assumethat the parameters
are such chat< I.Note that> ,) Thenconsider — andi—
whereA e (1, l/). Assume that d(e/p)/dp < 0 for p e [,}, sothat
behsvior is better at the lower ssnction and higher probability. Compute the
degree to which welfare is greater as a result cf this behavioral effect.
Finally, assume that x() is less than this benefit, which completes the
example.
°Dependingon x(p), it may be that the optimal probability at iinvolves
both groups being underdeterred. It is nonetheless true that behavior
improves: the social benefit from reducing underdeterrence of those
underdeterred significantly exceeds the loss from increasing underdeterrence
of those underdeterred modestly, as the han caused by both groups' acts is
the aame but the benefit for the marginal individual in the former group is
less than that for the latter.behavior, Behavior improves if the error is a lower fraction of the actual
probability as thie probability increases, because less of a divergence in
perceived expected sanctions will result. If behavior improves sufficiently,
the higher enforcement cost will be warranted,
The importance of this phenomenon depends on the relationship between
individuals' errors in estimating the probability of apprehension and the
actual probability. The example we offered in the introduction auggeata the
plausibility of the assumption that errors are a greater fraction of the
probability when probabilities are very low than when they are higher. To
guide enforcement policy, empirical research on this point would be useful.
For exemple, one might attempt to infer probability perceptions from behavior,
which could be accomplished in an experimental setting, or survey individuals
concerning their perceptions. Work in cognitive psychology concerning
probability perceptions might also illuminate the issue. Finally, one could
examine analytically how individuals' probability estimstas based on given
priora and limited sets of observations differ when the probability generating
the observations differs.5 Such research might reveal that relative errors
are rather large for probabilities of apprehension that otherwise would be
optimal with maximal sanctions, while much lower for the probabilities and
sanctions actually observed.
Sahs (1991) model assumes individuals' estimates are determined by their
limited observations. For his purposes, only the crime rate and not the
magnitude of individuals' errors is relevant, so ha does not explore how such
errors may be affected by the actual probability of apprehension.References
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